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Why Work When You Can Shirk?: Worker Productivity 
in an Experimental Setting 
 
Russell Engel 
Sacred Heart University 
 
 
 
Employee shirking has the potential to be extremely costly to firms. To counter the productivity 
loss caused by shirking, firms may institute various incentive schemes. Previous experimental 
research has shown that while monitoring does decrease shirking, some subjects work without 
explicit financial incentives. This paper presents the experimental results of an economic 
experiment designed to investigate the effect of various incentive schemes on subject behavior. 
Subjects are allowed to engage two tasks; one task mimics work for an employer, the other task 
allows for gains due to shirking. We find that subjects who are given incentives to shirk do in 
fact shirk, but monitoring and an attainable quota lead to increased productivity. However, when 
the quota is unattainable, subjects revolt and engage in a high amount of shirking. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     There is a long standing and mature theoretical literature dealing with the principal-agent 
problem (Mirrlees (1975), Grossman and Hart (1983)). A key aspect of the principal-agent 
problem is the motivation of workers who are rational cheaters. Nagin (2002) defines a rational 
cheater as someone who will shirk when the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal 
cost. A rational cheater will exert low effort on the job if he thinks he can get away with it. 
Recent reports estimate that shirking workers cost employers billions of dollars in productivity 
losses yearly1. Employers (principals) who are aware of the financial incentives they are giving 
employees (agents) may introduce a monitoring system with performance goals to alleviate the 
perceived problem. These issues with worker motivation are difficult and complex. Consider a 
recent New York City court case: 
     On March 9, 2006, John B. Sooner, a New York City administrative law judge, recommended 
that Toquir Choudhri, a 14-year veteran of the city Department of Education, receive only a 
reprimand for disobedience, even though supervisors wanted him fired for using the Internet for 
personal matters2. Spooner wrote that Choudhri credibly stated that he completed all assignments 
given to him by his boss and used the internet while he awaited further assignments. These 
statements were corroborated by the absence of proof that Choudhri was ever criticized for poor 
productivity or for not completing specific assignments.3 The New York City Chancellor of 
Education, Joel Klein, decided to fire Choudhri anyway. Klein stated that `the penalty of 
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termination is appropriate and not shocking to one's sense of fairness, .... Choudhri's abuse of the 
Internet at the time he is supposed to be performing his job demonstrates his disinterest in the 
job.'4  
     The worker in the above case was fired for shirking on the job when his employer found him 
surfing the internet. The worker did not think he deserved to be fired because he had completed 
all of his assignments. The worker thought he was being monitored in regard to fulfillment of 
some quota, and he had fulfilled his quota, but the employer disagreed. This case demonstrates 
the problems caused when the monitoring system is not well delineated, but it also shows how 
concerned some employers are about any behavior consistent with shirking. In this paper, we 
will examine how well these types of schemes work when they are clearly stated and consistently 
enforced. We will contrast our results with previous research which showed that workers may 
work harder than required by explicit financial incentives. 
     Past experimental research (Cadsby et al. (2007), Dickinson and Villeval (2008)) has shown 
that some workers in a laboratory setting work without incentives. It is important to investigate if 
these laboratory results indicate behaviors we would see in a real work setting, or if the 
possibility exists that these observations are an artifact of the experimental design. This paper 
attempts to place subjects in a more refined laboratory setting to get a cleaner look at subject 
behavior towards work effort with low financial incentives. Cadsby et al. (2007), and Dickinson 
and Villeval (2008) were not specifically looking at effort with low incentives, so there is much 
remaining value to their research even if the observations of subjects working without incentives 
are an artifact of their design. 
     A common approach used in the laboratory to investigate the principal-agent problem is to 
give subjects a cost function and have them choose some effort level. Nalbantian and Schotter 
(1997), for example presents an experiment in which a subject is monitored with probability. If 
the subject is not expending a certain level of `effort', he will be terminated. The `effort' in this 
case is not physical exertion but rather a figurative effort. This number they pick is indeed 
interpreted as effort and therefore has the property that effort is now explicit. While this matches 
clearly with their models, it is not clear that subjects perceive this choice as analogous to 
physical or mental exertion. The )(e  chosen by the subject is costly to the subject but it is 
possible that this is too abstract to model real work. Putting the workers through a real effort 
experiment will allow an answer as to whether simply choosing effort garners the same behavior 
as exerting effort, and if it does not, one can be confident that the real effort experiment is a 
better proxy for the workplace. 
     While an agent's outside option can be represented rather easily in a theoretical framework, it 
is not so trivial to do in a laboratory. To think of this one must place himself in the position of 
the subject in the experiment. The subject arrives at the laboratory and is assigned a computer 
terminal. They are given the option of engaging some task and earning X or he can take the 
outside option (sit still) and earn Y. If the disparity between the outside option and the 
participation option is not large, there exists the possibility that the subject will engage the game 
to avoid boredom. 
     The aforementioned research by Cadsby et al. (2007), and Dickinson and Villeval (2008) 
found that subjects contribute effort even when they have no financial reason to do so. The idea 
of a moral imperative not to shirk is given as a reason for this behavior by Dickinson. Cadsby's 
experiment gives subjects seven scrambled letters and the subjects are instructed to make as 
many words as possible in a given time period. The subjects are allowed to choose a piece rate or 
a flat rate scheme, the piece rate will pay them per word, and the flat rate will give them some 
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stated amount with no requirement on word creation. These incentives should lead students who 
think they are endowed with word creation ability and low effort cost to choose the piece rate 
scheme and the subjects who have high effort cost or are not good at word creation to choose the 
flat rate scheme. The interesting observation is that there are significantly more than zero words 
created by the subjects who choose the flat rate scheme. This is contrary to the incentive 
structure, and one would not believe the students feel a moral imperative to unscramble letters. 
Dickinson and Villeval (2008) use a real effort task and they observe that some of the subjects 
(25%) contribute at or above the desired output level even when monitoring is set to zero. 
Dickinson, as noted earlier, suggests this as either intrinsic motivation or integrity and 
commitment to moral principles. It is possible that subjects feel a moral imperative because they 
are interacting with a human principal, but that is not the case in Cadsby et al. (2007). The 
intrinsic motivation argument is plausible in both experiments. The subjects might enjoy 
unscrambling letters, and they might enjoy moving along a curve to get a high value, but it is not 
clear that observations made under these conditions should be interpreted as analogous to 
intrinsic motivation one might experience in the real world. In both experiments, the subjects 
could engage in effort, or do nothing. It is possible that they were engaging the tasks because 
they were bored. This is similar to Choudri's claim that he browsed the internet only because he 
had no other work to do. If the subjects in the experiment do not engage the task, they have 
nothing else to do. 
     Other experiments have shown that outside options have important effects. Lei, Plott, and 
Noussair (2001) show that excess trading in an asset market can be reduced by giving subjects 
something to do beyond trading in the asset market. Pevnitskaya and Palfrey (2008) show that 
over entry into an auction can be reduced by allowing subjects an outside option of a 
computerized version of rock-paper-scissors. Van Dijk et al. (2001) conduct an experiment 
where subjects are enabled to work on two tasks in the same period. The earnings from one task 
go in to a group account while the earnings from the other task go in to a private account, similar 
to a public goods game. This alleviates the effort only due to boredom problem that is plausible 
in the Cadsby et al. (2007) and Dickinson (2004) papers. The specific task the paper uses has the 
subjects search a grid looking for the highest payoff. The idea of having two of these for the 
subjects to play cures the boredom critique. 
     The experimental design for this paper allows for subjects to play a valuable outside option. 
This should eliminate play in the primary task when there is no financial incentive to play the 
primary task. Then the question of how much monitoring is necessary to get the desired amount 
of effort can be addressed. The desired amount of effort will be explicit in terms of a quota. 
     The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains the experimental design, section 3 contains 
a simple model of predicted behavior in the experiment, and section 4 reports analysis of the 
results of the experiment. Finally, there will be some concluding remarks. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
     The experiment conducted for this paper was designed to give subjects incentives similar to 
those faced by many workers. There are 30 periods in the experiment, and each period lasts 45 
seconds with 30 seconds between each period.. The experiment consists of a primary task (Task 
A) and a secondary task (Task B). The subjects can choose to split effort, at their discretion, 
between the two tasks. Task A is designed to mimic work for an employer. The subject will view 
a randomly generated four-digit number and his task is to type the same number in the space 
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provided. Every time a subject has completed typing the number, he can hit a button and start on 
a new randomly generated number. An example of this can be seen in Table 1. The payoff to the 
subjects depends on the quota they face and a monitoring level. The subjects earn an effective 
wage of 300 ECUs per period. If they are monitored and the amount of four-digit numbers typed 
is less than the quota they are considered fired without pay, and their earnings are zero. If a 
subject is not monitored, he earns 300 ECUs from Task A regardless of whether or not his quota 
is met.  
 
TABLE 2 
TASK A 
 
Probability 
of being 
monitored: 
25% 
Quota: 2 
Number 
Completed: 
2 
Type this: 7072 
Enter here:  
You entered:  
 
     The other task subjects can engage in (Task B) is a matching pennies game, shown in Table 2, 
that they will play against a computer opponent. The computer is playing a Mixed-Strategy Nash 
Equilibrium of choosing heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time. The matching pennies 
game was chosen because it is a cognitively easy task, and the chosen payoffs have the property 
that the expected utility is increasing in the amount of time spent on the task. This is intended to 
mimic the utility a subject would receive from shirking, whether it be reading the newspaper, 
talking to friends, or browsing the internet. Without Task B, it is possible that the subject would 
play Task A simply because they are bored and find Task A more stimulating than sitting 
quietly. With Task B, the subjects could still choose to sit still, but they now have the alternative 
action involving activity of an outside option that they can earn money by playing. 
 
TABLE 2 
MATCHING PENNIES 
 
  
  
 Computer  
 Heads   Tails  
 Subject  
  
 Heads   2,0   0,2  
 Tails   0,2   2,0  
 
     Any earnings from Task B are in addition to the 300 ECUs earned in Task A, but they are not 
guaranteed. If the subject is monitored in task 1, and their number completed is less than their 
quota, any earnings they made in Task B are wiped out. This is a punishment akin to getting 
fired. One could argue that the subject should keep their outside earnings since an employer can 
fire an employee without pay, but cannot take away the utility they received from shirking. There 
will be some fine associated with getting fired and for simplicity the amount of that fine will be 
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equal to the earnings form Task B. This is done to exact some punishment beyond lost wages. In 
the laboratory, the worker will be rehired the next period, so just taking away the wages for one 
period is not punitive enough. Regardless of how much is potentially earned on Task B, a subject 
who is monitored and has not met his quota always earns 0 ECUs for the period. 
     In order to observe the subjects responses to a variety of situations, there were 6 different 
monitoring levels (0%, 15%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) and 5 different quotas (8, 12, 15, 185, 
and 25). This lead to 30 combinations of monitoring levels and quotas and each subject faced 
each combination once. This resulted in the 30 periods mentioned before. The order that the 
subjects saw the various quotas and monitoring levels was determined randomly prior to the 
experiment. At the end of every period the subjects would see a screen that would inform them 
whether or not they were monitored, and their payoff at the end of each period. 
     The experiment was conducted over four sessions and 32 subjects participated. The subjects 
for the experiment were undergraduate students at the Florida State University. The experiment 
was computer based and conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher 1999). When the subjects 
arrived, they were assigned to computer terminals. The instructions for the experiment (see 
Appendix) were read aloud and subjects had a chance to ask questions. The subjects were paid a 
$10.00 show up fee, and were able to earn money based upon their performance in the 
experiment. The average earnings per subject for the experiment were $24.96. 
 
THEORY 
 
     Given the incentive structure in the experiment, we can now develop a model to predict the 
behavior of the subjects. Let t  be the amount of time a subject spends on Task A, let ( )0,1∈m  
be the monitoring level the subject faces at the beginning of each period, let Q  ( )3,25∈  be the 
quota the subject faces at the beginning of each period. Let )(tiφ  be the payoff a subject receives 
for working on Task B ( 0<
dt
d iφ  because the more time a subject spends on Task A, the less time 
they have for Task B). The probability that a subject meets the quota ( Q ) in time ( )t  is 
represented by the term ( ).,QtPi  This probability is increasing in t  




 0>
dt
dPi , because the more 
time spent on Task A, the more likely they are to meet the quota; ( )QtPi ,  is decreasing in Q  






0<
dQ
dPi  because the higher the quota, the more difficult it is to meet it given the 45 second 
time constraint. Both ),(tiφ  and ( )QtPi ,  are individual specific due to the heterogeneity in 
subject ability (subjects who are good at Task A could also be good at Task B, but that is 
irrelevant to the analysis of this problem). Recall that subjects can earn 300 ECUs each period if 
they meet the quota, or are not monitored. The payoff function subjects face can be represented 
as: 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ))(3001)(300,=,, tmtQtmPmQt iiii φφ +−++Π  (1) 
 
     This payoff function shows that if a subject is not monitored, they receive ( );)(300 tiφ+  if 
they are monitored they only receive ( ))(300 tiφ+  if they meet the quota, which happens with 
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probability ( ).,QtPi  In order to demonstrate some implications of this basic model we will 
assume simplifying assumptions for iφ  and iP . Let btati −=)(φ  , and 
 ( )



 ≤
Qctfor
Qctfor
Q
ct
QtPi
>1
=,  
The results we derive are not special to these functional forms, but will hold for a broad range of 
functions satisfying the conditions: 0<
dt
d iφ  and 0.>
dt
dPi  Equation 1 now becomes: 
  
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )btambta
Q
ctmmQti −+−+−+Π 3001300=,,  (2) 
The general problem is to maximize iΠ  given some .Tt ≤  
 
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ))(3001)(300,=,,max tmtQtmPmQt iiiiTt φφ +−++Π≤  (3) 
The solution is: 
 .300
2
1=
mcb
mbQbQmcamct +−+∗  (4) 
 
     Given this solution we can show the following points. 
 
     Implication 1: When the monitoring level is zero, a subject should not work on Task A. 
When there is no monitoring, equation 1 becomes: 
 
 ( ))(300= tii φ+Π  (5) 
  
     As stated earlier, the function )(tiφ  is declining everywhere in t , any time spent on Task A 
means less earnings can be made in Task B. So, < 0id t
dt
Π
∀ . Therefore, to max 
( ),)(300= tU ii φ+  a subject should choose 0,=t  and we should observe subjects playing only 
Task B. 
 
     Implication 2: As the monitoring level increases, a subject should spend more time on Task 
A. 
 
 0>
2
1=
300
2
1
= 2cm
Q
dm
mcb
mbQbQmcamcd
dm
dt 



 +−+
∗
 (6) 
 
     As the monitoring level increases, shirking behavior is more likely to be punished. To avoid 
this punishment, a subject has to meet the quota. So, as the monitoring level increase, a subject 
should spend more time on Task A. 
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     Implication 3: If the subject chooses to work on Task A, once he meets the quota, he should 
spend no additional time on Task A. 
 
If ∃  tˆ  ..ts  ( )ˆ, = 1iP t Q , any ˆ>t t∗  will reduce the subjects expected utility. Let 
( )ˆ, = 1,iP t Q  and let ˆ> .t t∗  
If subject chooses ˆ= :t t  ( ) ( )( )ˆ ˆ ˆ= 300 ( ) 1 300 ( ) = 300 ( ).i i i im t m t tϕ ϕ ϕΠ + + − + +  
If subject chooses := ∗tt  ( ) ( )( ) ).(300=)(3001)(300= ∗∗∗ ++−++Π ttmtm iiii φφφ  
ˆ300 ( ) > 300 ( )i it tϕ ϕ
∗+ +  since ˆ>t t∗  and iφ  is decreasing in .t  
 
     Implication 4: For a given monitoring level, the subject will increase observed effort as 
quota increases until some point, as the quota gets relatively large, they will then exert less effort 
on Task A. 
Given that: 
 ( )



 ≤
Qctfor
Qctfor
Q
ct
QtPi
>1
=,  
we have to consider that a subject should never choose  
 1 300 ˆ= >
2
mc mca bQ mbQt t
mcb
∗ + − +  
where tˆ  is defined by ( )ˆ, = 1.iP t Q  In our example ( ) 1=,QtPi  when .= Qct  Therefore ˆ = .Qt c
The optimal amount of effort a subject will choose is  
 1 300ˆmin( , ) = min , .
2
mc mca bQ mbQ Qt t
mcb c
∗ + − + 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( )
300ˆ< when >
1
at t Q mc
b m
∗ +
+
 
  
 
ˆ 1= = > 0
Qd
dt c
dQ dQ c
 
 
   (7) 
 
 
 0<1=
300
2
1
=
mc
m
dQ
mcb
mbQbQmcamcd
dQ
dt +−



 +−+
∗
 (8) 
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     We see in Equation 7 that for 
( )mcmb
aQ
1
300>
+
+  a subject's effort will be increasing with ,Q  
and in Equation 8 that for 
( )mcmb
aQ
1
300<
+
+  a subjects effort will be decreasing in .Q  
Fundamentally what this is saying is that subjects will maximize their probability of earning the 
300 ECU wage when the quota is relatively low, but at some point increasing the quota will lead 
to a reduction in the effort (amount of numbers typed) given to Task A. 
 
     Implication 5: If the subject cannot meet the quota even if they were to spend all of their time 
on Task A, he should not spend any time on Task A. 
     If ( )QtP ,  0=  ,Tt ≤∀  we see that equation 1 reduces to ( )( ))(3001= tmU ii φ+− . Again, the 
subject should only work on Task B. 
 
     Implication 6: If the subject cannot meet the quota even if they were to spend all of their time 
on Task A, and the monitoring level is 100%, observations of the subjects playing either task 
would imply that they would rather engage the experiment than sit still. 
     If 1=m , equation 1 becomes: 
 
 ( )( ))(300,= tQtP iii φ+Π  (9) 
 
     If ( )QtP ,  ,0= Tt ≤∀  then equation 9 is equal to zero. The subject gets zero financial gain 
from either task, so the subject should not engage either task unless they prefer it to sitting still.  
     Given these implications, we should expect the subjects to only play Task B when the 
monitoring level is zero, and to increase their effort on Task A as monitoring is increased. The 
subjects should also increase their effort on Task A when the quota increases if the quota is 
relatively low. An increase in the quota beyond some point will lead the subjects to reduce effort 
on Task A. If a subject meets the quota in a given period, he should then switch to playing only 
Task B as he longer has any financial incentive to play Task A. When the quota is unattainable, 
the subjects should not try to reach the quota but instead spend all of their time on Task B. If the 
quota is unattainable and the subject is definitely going to be monitored, any engagement of 
either Task A or Task B implies that the subject prefers engaging the experiment to sitting still. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
     Result 1: When the monitoring level is zero, ninety-one percent of the subjects do not meet or 
exceed the quota. However, when the quota is small, many subjects meet that quota. 
     Table 3 shows that subjects are highly unlikely to exert effort when they are not being 
monitored. Whereas Implication 1 suggests that subjects should exert zero effort when the 
monitoring level is set to zero, the data show that some subjects do meet the quota when the 
monitoring level is 0%. Dickinson and Villeval (2008) found that 25% of subjects contributed at 
or above the desired output level; we find less than that. Table 3 shows that there are 14 out of 
152 (09%) observations where the subject meets or exceeds the quota. But, we have to note that 
not all subjects could reach all quotas. Only one subject in the entire experiment met 25=Q , 
five subjects met 18=Q , seventeen subjects met 15=Q , all thirty two subjects met 8=Q , and 
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12=Q . So, to get another estimate of worker effort when monitoring level is zero we can use 
the the highest observed effort level for each subject to note if someone had the ability to meet a 
given quota. This leads to 14 out of 87 ( )16%  workers meeting or exceeding the quota when the 
monitoring level is zero. This estimate is not perfect as it has the ability to underestimate 
shirking. Some subjects may have been able to meet quotas that they were not observed to meet 
if they had worked harder. Best stated, when monitoring level is zero, the percentage of workers 
that meet or exceed the quota is in the range of 9% to 16%. Furthermore, most of the 
observations where workers meet or exceed the quota, 10 out of 14 ( ),71%  occur when the quota 
is relatively low (Q=8). When 8>Q  and monitoring is zero, only 4 out of 55 ( 07% ) subjects 
meet or exceed the quota. 
TABLE 3 
SUBJECT EFFORT WHEN MONITORING LEVEL IS ZERO 
 
 
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
     To test Implications 2 and 4, we run a linear random effects panel regression. This type of 
regression controls for omitted variables that differ between subjects and omitted variables that 
vary within subjects over time. We will regress the amount of four-digit numbers typed on 
monitoring level (Implication 2), quota less than 15, and quota greater than 15 (Implication 4). 
The regressor, dummy ,15<Q  is set to 1 when 15<Q  and zero when 15,>Q  dummy 15>Q  is set to 
1 when 15>Q  and zero when 15<Q . If subjects respond in the experiment as predicted by 
Implication 4 they will increase effort up until some ,Q  and then begin to reduce effort. If this is 
the case, we need a constant for both situations. The regressor dummy 5≤period  is set to 1 for 
periods 1-5 and zero otherwise. This is used to determine if behavior in the first five periods is 
significantly different than play in latter periods. This could be a factor if the subjects experience 
any learning effects in the first five periods. Prior to the experiment, it is unlikely that the 
subjects know how many four-digit-numbers they can type in 45 seconds; the subjects may use 
the initial periods to gauge their ability. Table 4 reports the results of this regression. 
     Result 2: Monitoring has a positive significant impact on effort given to task 1.  
     Table 4 shows that as monitoring increases subjects choose to exert more effort (type more 
numbers) on the monitored task. This result is consistent with Implication 2. Specifically, if 
monitoring goes up by one percentage point, the average subject increases the amount of four-
digit numbers by 7.9%. Figure 1 is a scatterplot of four-digit-numbers typed on quota for a given 
monitoring level. Figure 1 allows us to see the impact of monitoring in a sequence. There are 160 
observations in each cell. The data have been jittered due to the high level of overlap of the data 
points. The dark spots in each cell represent the most overlap. We see that when the monitoring 
level is low, observations are clustered around zero effort. As monitoring increases the mass of 
Number of four-digit numbers typed when monitoring level = 0% 
  0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q NC>Q Period 
Quota 8 21 8 3 0 0 7 3 7 
12 26 2 3 1 0 2 1 10 
15 29 2 1 0 0 1 0 17 
18 21 1 2 0 0 0 0 21 
25 14 13 5 0 0 0 0 2 
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observations starts to move up, and when monitoring is at 100% we see a very strong correlation 
between the quota and the amount typed. If we look at Figure 1 we see that the subjects are 
exerting effort where monitoring is zero and 25.=Q  The subjects saw this combination of quota 
and monitoring level early in the experiment (period 2). The significance of the regressor dummy
5≤period  in Table 4 shows that subjects were playing differently early in the experiment. It is 
possible that the subjects were exploring the game space. 
 
TABLE 4 
RESULTS OF LINEAR RANDOM EFFECTS PANEL REGRESSION OF NUMBER OF 
FOUR-DIGIT NUMBERS TYPED ON POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. 
 
 Coef. Std. Err P-value 
Monitoring* .0786 .0040 0.000 
quota( <15)* .5140 .0742 0.000 
quota( >15)* -.9551 .0440 0.000 
dummy Q<15 1.404 .8858 0.281 
dummy Q>15 * 6.257 1.002 0.000 
dummy per iod<5 * 1.850 .3807 0.000 
Number of Obs 960   
 
 
     Result 3: Once subjects meet the quota in Task A, most switch to Task B exclusively. 
     If we refer back to Figure 2 we see few observations where the amount typed is greater than 
the quota. Consider the case where monitoring is equal to 100%, there are 70 instances where the 
amount typed is greater than or equal to the quota, of these 70 instances, 62 hit the quota exactly. 
In Figure 2, we can observe that the number typed is rarely above the quota. 
     Result 4: The quota level (for quota less than 15) has a positive significant impact on effort. 
The quota level (for quota greater than 15) has a negative significant impact.  
     Table 4 shows that, consistent with Implication 4, when the quota is relatively small subjects 
increase their effort on Task A. However, when the quota is greater than 15 subjects' effort is 
decreasing as the quota increases. We can see in Figure 2 that when the quota increases from 8 to 
12, there is an increase in the amount of effort given to Task A. When the quota increases to 15, 
we can see a drop off in the effort given to Task A, particularly when monitoring is less than 
50%. 
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FIGURE 1 
SUBJECT EFFORT WHEN MONITORING LEVEL IS ZERO  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
SUBJECT EFFORT GIVEN A CONSTANT QUOTA 
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     Result 5: When the quota is set to 25, this is effectively ( )QtP ,  0=  ,t∀  and monitoring is 
less than 100%, subjects prefer to spend more time on Task B than Task A. 
     Prior to the experiment, the quota level of 25  was believed to be so high that no subject could 
hit it, and would therefore be implicitly unattainable. This held true for 30 of the 32 subjects, but 
one subject was able to reach 25=Q  and another was able to type 24 four-digit numbers . In the 
minds of these two subjects, the quota of 25, was probably not unattainable. The other subjects 
never typed as much as 20 four-digit numbers. So, for 30 of the 32 subjects, 25=Q  should have 
been inferred as unattainable. Implication 3 demonstrated that if a subject could not meet the 
quota even if they spent all of their time on Task A, then they should not try to meet the quota. 
Table 5 shows that when subjects think they cannot meet the quota, they will not try to meet the 
quota. If we contrast this unattainable quota with the high quota of 18, we see that the subjects 
exert much more effort when there is at least some possibility that they might reach the quota. 
Consider, for example, the case where monitoring = 50%.When the quota is 25, the number of 
subjects that type five or fewer four-digit numbers is 26 out of 32 (81%); when the quota is 18, 
the number of subjects that type five or fewer four-digit numbers is 5 out of 24 (21%). If we look 
to Figure 2 we can see that effort given to Task A is much greater when the quota is 15 compared 
to when the quota is 25. Result 1 showed that some subjects will meet easily attainable quotas 
even without financial incentives. Result 5 shows that unattainable quotas will cause subjects to 
greatly reduce effort. 
 
TABLE 5 
SUBJECT EFFORT WHEN Q=25 
 
number  of four-digit numbers  typed when Q=25 
  0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q Period 
M 0% 14 13 5 0 0 0 2 
15% 31 0 0 1 0 0 24 
30% 25 3 2 1 1 0 13 
50% 26 3 0 2 1 0 19 
75% 15 6 8 2 1 0 8 
100% 12 5 9 4 2 1 30 
 
TABLE 6 
SUBJECT EFFORT WHEN Q=18 
 
number  of four-digit numbers  typed when Q=18 
  0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q Period 
M 0% 21 1 2 0 0 0 21 
15% 20 1 2 1 0 1 20 
30% 22 1 6 1 0 1 28 
50% 5 9 8 2 0 1 6 
75% 9 1 11 3 0 1 26 
100% 1 6 10 7 0 1 23 
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      Result 6: When the Quota is set to 25 ( ( )QtP ,  0=  ),t∀ and the monitoring level is set to 
100%, subjects do not sit still, they engage both Task A and Task B. 
     Table 7 shows when monitoring is 100% and 25=Q  many subjects exert effort even though 
they know they will not meet the quota. One subject was extremely fast and did meet the quota, 
another made it to 24. No one else made it to 20. Seven subjects engaged neither task, two 
subjects engaged both, three subjects played only the outside option, and twenty engaged only 
the typing task. Similar to this result, both Cadsby et al. (2007), and Dickinson and Villeval 
(2008) found subjects contributing without financial incentives. Result 6 lends support to the 
claim that subjects will engage tasks simply because they are bored. One could argue that since 
the only possible way a subject could get any earnings was to try and reach the quota, effort 
given to Task A was not play due to boredom. While this is plausible, it is not likely given the 
intensity of effort given to Task A. If we look at Tables 5 and 6, when monitoring is set to 100%, 
we see that work intensity is higher for 18=Q . Consider that when 25=Q  only 15 out of 32 
(47%) subjects type more than 10 numbers, but when 18=Q  17 out of 24 (71%) subjects type 
more than 10 numbers. So, the workers who choose to give effort to Task A when monitoring is 
100% and 25=Q  do not appear to be exerting high effort, and that is consistent with play due to 
boredom. 
 
TABLE 7 
SUBJECT EFFORT WHEN MONITORING LEVEL=1 
 
number  of four-digit numbers  typed when m=100% 
  0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q NC>Q Period 
Quota 8 0 28 4 0 0 27 4 5 
12 2 3 26 0 1 24 1 22 
15 0 4 25 3 0 9 3 14 
18 1 6 10 7 0 1 0 23 
25 12 5 9 4 2 1 0 30 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
     This paper presented an experimental study of worker productivity. The main objective of the 
paper was to examine the effect of various incentive schemes on subject behavior in an 
environment that is meant to mimic a work setting where the worker has the ability to shirk by 
engaging in some task other than work for the employer. A secondary objective of the paper was 
to examine past experimental results that showed subjects exerting effort when no financial 
incentive to do so existed, and determine if this was consistent with play due to boredom. 
     The key finding of this paper is that workers in a laboratory work setting with an outside 
option available to them do shirk, but monitoring is quite successful at reducing shirking. In fact, 
when the quota is not difficult to attain, very little monitoring is necessary to gain subject 
compliance. However, when the quota is unattainable, the subjects revolt and exert very little 
effort. When there is no monitoring, we do observe that some subjects may still have some 
intrinsic motivation to play the primary task, but less than previous work reported. Another 
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finding is that by allowing subjects to participate in an outside option, we are able to mitigate 
play that is due to boredom. And by implicitly disallowing earnings we are able to see that 
subjects prefer to play tasks instead of sitting still. 
     Subjects in this experiment were observed to work until they met their quota and then 
switched to the outside option. This paper began with the story of a worker who was fired for a 
lack of productivity. But it is not clear that he was shirking. Once he completed his assignments, 
or met his quota, he played the outside option available to him. This is the exact behavior 
subjects exhibited in the laboratory. 
     Future work will examine if subjects who are monitored over any shirking behavior exert 
more effort on their primary task than subjects monitored over performance goals. The issue of 
self selection will also be examined by paying subjects based on the amount of numbers they 
type as opposed to a flat wage. Subjects will then be allowed to choose the pay for performance 
scheme or the flat wage and monitoring scheme. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. Frauenheim, Ed. "Stop Reading This Headline and Get Back to Work." CNET, Monday, 
July 11, 2005, 
http://news.com.com/Stop+reading+this+headline+and+get+back+to+work/2100-
1022_3-5783552.html 
2. Klopott, Freeman. "Should You Be Fired for Using the Internet While at Work?" PC 
World, Tuesday, May 02, 2006, http://pcworld.com/article/id,125597-
page,1/article.html?RSS=RSS 
3. Department of Education v. Choudhri, New York City Office of Administrative Trials 
and Hearings, No. 722/06 (3/9/06) 
4. Associated Press. "NYC Fires Man For Web Surfing At Work." CBS News, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/06/tech/main1596034.shtml  
5. The quota level of 18 only applies to sub jects 9-32. The first 8 subjects had a quota of 
3 instead of 18. 
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APPENDIX 
 
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
 
     In this part of the experiment you will be able to work on two tasks. You can split your time 
among the tasks however you choose. Meaning you can spend all of your time on task A and 
none on task B, all of your time on task B and none on task A, or some combination of task A 
and task B. Each round in this experiment is 45 seconds long. 
     In the box marked task A on your handout a number is displayed. Your task is to type the 
number you see in the box provided. Every time you click the " OK" button, a new number will 
come up and you can go through the task again. In each round of the experiment, the default 
payment for task A is 300 ECUs (1000 ECUs = $1.00). Payment will be further described below. 
     If you look at your handout, you will see two other pieces of information for task A (Quota 
and Probability of being monitored). 
     Monitoring means that the computer is checking to make sure that you have met the quota 
(defined in next paragraph). The " monitoring level" tells you how likely it is that the computer is 
going to check on you. If the " monitoring level" is 0%, that means the computer will not check 
on you. If it is 100%, that means the computer will definitely check on you. 
     If you are monitored: The " quota" is the minimum number of task A numbers you have to 
type in order to earn 300 ECUs. In other words, to earn the 300 ECUs, you must type at least the 
amount of numbers specified by the quota and they must be typed correctly. Your screen will 
update the amount of completed correct numbers you have typed (" number completed" on your 
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handout). If you do not type enough numbers correctly to cover the quota, your earnings for the 
round are zero. 
     If you are not monitored: If you meet the quota you earn 300 ECUs. If you don't meet the 
quota, you earn 300 ECUs. 
     The monitoring level is stated at the beginning of every round. At the end of each round, the 
computer will generate a random number between 1 and 100 with all numbers being equally 
likely to determine whether or not you are in fact monitored. For example, assume you enter the 
round and the " monitoring level" is set to 40 (this is a 40% chance that you will be monitored). 
If the number drawn at the end of the round is between 41 and 100, you will not be monitored. If 
the number drawn is between 1 and 40, you will be monitored. 
     Alternatively, you may also choose to work on task B (the bottom section of the handout).  
     In this task you will be playing a game against the computer. The computer is programmed to 
pick either option H or option T. You also have the ability to pick option H or option T (you do 
this by choosing H or T and then clicking the " ok" button). 
     If both of you pick the same option you win, and earn 2 ECUs, if the choices don't match, the 
computer wins, and you earn zero ECUs. However, if you are monitored in task A, and you did 
not meet the quota, whatever earnings you had accumulated in task B will be wiped out. 
     The example in the handout has the monitoring level at 25 (that is a 25% chance that you will 
be monitored), and the quota is set at 2. If the " number completed" at the end of the 45 second 
round is greater than the quota, or equal to the quota, you will earn 300 ECUs from task A plus 
whatever you earned on task B. If " number completed" is less than the quota, two things can 
happen: 
     1. You are monitored, and you earn zero for the round (zero from task A and zero from task 
B) 
     2. You are not monitored, and you earn 300 ECUs from task A plus whatever you earned on 
task B. 
     On the second page of your handout, the example shows a case where monitoring occurred. 
However, since the quota was met, the earnings from task A are 300 ECUs. Your total earnings 
are 306, because you earned 6 ECUs from task B. If the quota had not been met, the task A 
earnings would be zero, and your earnings from task B would be wiped out, so your total 
earnings for the round would be zero. 
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